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AbstrAct. Analytic just war theorists often attempt to construct ideal theories 
of military justice on the basis of intuitions about imaginary and sometimes 
outlandish examples, often taken from non-military contexts. This article argues 
for a sharp curtailment of this method and defends, instead, an empirically and 
historically informed approach to the ethical scrutiny of armed conflicts. After 
critically reviewing general philosophical reasons for being sceptical of the 
moral-theoretic value of imaginary hypotheticals, the article turns to some of the 
special problems that this method raises for appraisals of warfare. It examines 
some of the hypothetical examples employed in the construction of Jeff McMahan’s 
revisionist just war theory, and finds that they sometimes stipulate incompre-
hensible conditions, lead to argumentative impasses of diverging yet uncertain 
intuitions, and distract attention away from the real problems of war as we 
empirically know it. In contrast, empirical and historical studies of warfare rein-
force the deep connections between facts and values, and compel theorists to 
face uncomfortable moral ambiguities. Perhaps most importantly, the analytic 
method of focusing on imaginary hypothetical examples can not only be distracting, 
but it can also be genuinely dangerous. Hence, the article pays special attention 
to the way in which a seemingly innocuous fiction like the famous Ticking Time 
Bomb scenario can come to frame a new paradigm of inhumanity in the treatment 
of prisoners of war.
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I. IntroductIon
In the Postscript to the 5th edition of Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer casts doubt on the notion that issues of just war theory can be 
adequately addressed “by the familiar methods of analytic philosophy” 
(2015, 335). Here he has in mind the practice among academic philosophers, 
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writing in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, to construct ideal moral 
theories of military practice on the basis of intuitions about imaginary and 
sometimes outlandish examples, often taken from non-military contexts 
of human action. As Walzer suggests, a quick examination of bibliogra-
phies reveals that this kind of analytic just war theory tends to be more 
about moral philosophy than it is about war. Whereas his own seminal 
work on the subject of war was informed by voluminous reading in mil-
itary history and biography, the work of many of his recent philosophical 
critics does not appear to be nearly as empirically grounded. Accordingly, 
his postscript is a call to put the war back in just war theory. Being of like 
mind, my purpose here is to present a complementary critique of the ana-
lytic philosophical method. Accordingly, I shall critically examine the use 
of imaginary and non-military examples, and advocate for the virtues of a 
more empirical and historicized approach to the study of the ethics of war.
Since I shall be arguing for the sharp curtailment of imaginary exam-
ples in just war theory, but not for their complete abandonment, I shall 
start by describing in section II what may sometimes be legitimate uses 
of imaginary hypothetical examples. A recitation of some general sceptical 
arguments against this analytic philosophical method will then show its 
limitations as a supplement to empirical understanding. Sections III and 
IV draw upon these sceptical philosophical insights to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of this methodology as an approach to the ethics of war as 
it concerns (III) the killing of non-responsible combatants, including child 
warriors, and (IV) the treatment of detainees and the question of torture. 
II. AIms And LImIts of ImAgInAry exAmpLes
There may sometimes be a legitimate probative use of imaginary hypo-
theticals as counterexamples to test absolutist deontic claims. Thought 
experiments are frequently and typically used to test modal claims, which 
are claims about what is necessary or possible in science and metaphysics, 
or what is universally obligatory, forbidden, or permissible in ethics and 
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politics. Think of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s use of the now famous (enough 
to require no explanation here) case of the ‘unconscious violinist’ to 
defeat the claim that there is an absolute right to life, as has sometimes 
been supposed in arguments against the possibility of permissible abor-
tion (Jarvis Thomson 1971). For someone who struggles to empathize 
with the analogous case of a woman who is pregnant as a result of rape, 
this example might serve to awaken a salient dimension of moral imagina-
tion. Moving in the dialectically opposite direction, there may also be 
intellectual gains that come not from acquiescing to the intended proba-
tive force of an imaginary counterexample, but from the philosophical 
need to discover and articulate adequate reasons for resisting it. Cora 
Diamond (2002) finds such a ‘fruitful’ case in Plato’s systematic response 
to the tale of the Ring of Gyges in the Republic. According to Diamond’s 
modest defence of the analytic method, this and other such imaginary 
examples may be useful precisely because “[…] it is only through an 
understanding that departs from what is generally available or generally 
accepted” that we can gain new exploratory philosophical insights into 
human morality (2002, 233).
Some philosophers, such as Alan Sidelle, go so far as to suppose that, 
besides the employment of imaginary hypotheticals, “we have no alterna-
tive way to support or test modal claims.” In his view, to abandon this 
methodology would be “tantamount to just abandoning philosophy” 
(1996, 480). Again, although I am not calling for the abandonment of all 
imaginary examples in philosophy, but merely urging that they be dra-
matically circumscribed when it comes to just war theory, it is worth 
noting that Sidelle’s worry is demonstrably unfounded in this field. The 
arguments concerning conditions of ‘supreme emergency’ set forth in 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars show how empirical examples can exert 
probative force against absolutist deontic modal claims. We do not need 
to make things up in order to find an example in which a military and 
political threat is grave and inhumane enough, and the means of resis-
tance limited enough, that a putatively absolute moral prohibition against 
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aerial bombing of cities containing large civilian populations might rea-
sonably be shown to be defeasible. Walzer presents a credible argument 
that this was the case in the British campaign against Nazi Germany from 
May 1940 until perhaps as late as June 1942 (2015, 254-261). Nor do we 
need Jarvis Thomson’s medically implausible case of the unconscious 
violinist, in order to elicit the intuition that there is no absolute moral 
obligation to bring to term a pregnancy that results from rape. We can 
instead consider especially powerful and outlandish, yet actual cases com-
bining genocidal hostility, torture, rape, and forced pregnancy, given that 
we are also unfortunately in possession of a horrifying accumulation of 
relevant and compelling testimony.1 If the point of argument here is to 
enliven empathy for victims of rape, the empirical cases have far greater 
probative force than science fiction.
In addition to their probative use, carefully crafted imaginary 
examples may also serve a legitimate heuristic purpose in the inductive 
construction of a cogent just war theory. Actual historical examples are 
complex, often exhibiting a plurality of features that engage different and 
potentially competing dimensions of intuitive moral judgment. The 
method of employing hypothetical examples can cut through this com-
plexity by isolating specific features of possible circumstances that may 
help to bring out analytically simple moral intuitions. As Michael Davis 
acknowledges in his critique of imaginary hypotheticals in ethics, it is a 
common and legitimate heuristic practice in legal education to move from 
actual case law to hypothetical variations that have not yet occurred and 
may never occur. Such examples “[…] can be used to sharpen insight, to 
help us see distinctions we might otherwise have overlooked (because the 
distinctions are both clever and new to us)” (2012, 9). It is in this vein that 
Francis Kamm defends the use of imaginary examples as part of a “tech-
nique of equalizing cases.” Only when two cases are alike in all respects 
other than in the distinguishing features that mark a normative distinction 
– such as between harming and not-aiding – can we be reasonably certain 
of the intuitive importance of that distinction (2007, 427-428). Nenad 
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Miscevic similarly argues that imaginary hypothetical cases are “essential 
given the complexity of social life” because they help us to separate in 
our minds “[…] the morally relevant from irrelevant aspects that cannot 
be so clearly separated in empirical research bogged down in actual con-
tingent details of historically given political arrangements” (2013, 61-62).
Arrayed against this imaginative hypothetical method we find the 
sceptical arguments of such philosophers as Jonathan Dancy, Kathleen 
V. Wilkes, John D. Norton, Jakob Elster, and Michael Davis. It will be 
helpful for present purposes to recite their more comprehensive philo-
sophical concerns before turning to some specific problems that this 
method presents in the just war literature.
One of the common concerns of these sceptics focuses on the fact 
that imaginary examples are generally under-described or indeterminate 
in comparison with the fullness of factual reality; and this is typically espe-
cially true of outlandish examples. Wilkes (1988) and Elster (2011) note that 
presentations of outlandish cases tend to focus almost entirely on those 
stipulated conditions that differ from the real world, leaving out examination 
of how those imaginary conditions might change other morally relevant 
conditions. This is what leads to those familiar classroom discussions in 
which students want to know more about the case than is explicitly stip-
ulated. Instructor’s question: “Would you hook up to Robert Nozick’s 
Experience Machine (1974, 42-45)?” Legitimate student response: “I don’t 
know. What are other people doing? Am I to imagine that I’m the first 
adopter? Or am I the last agent standing?” And so on. As Elster avers, the 
problem here is that “[…] in order for us to apply our moral competence 
to a given case, we need to fully understand the case, so that we can iden-
tify all the morally relevant factors involved.” And yet, in “outlandish cases” 
we often “fail to fully understand the situation described” (2011, 250).
In addition to the worry about the indeterminacy of imaginary hypo-
theticals, Dancy offers a further epistemological critique of the analogical 
reasoning process involved in their employment. As he observes, the 
basic assumption of this analytic method is that we can gain insight into 
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difficult actual cases from the intuitions that we form in response to 
putatively easier imaginary ones. The imaginary cases are designed to be 
easier than the actual ones by virtue of being less complicated. Given this 
essential difference, the cogency of analogical arguments from easy imag-
inary cases to difficult actual ones must hinge upon “relevant similarity” 
(1985, 146). Yet the philosophical judgment about relevant similarity pre-
supposes the kind of moral understanding of the actual cases that the imag-
inary ones are supposed to provide.
Even if we do learn from the imaginary case the importance that a 
property has there, this will only help us to reach a decision here if we 
decide that the actual case has no further morally relevant properties. 
The imaginary case cannot help us in this decision at all. Essentially we 
have to make up our minds about the moral make-up of the actual case 
before we can come to a view about whether the imaginary case is after 
all a reliable guide (Dancy 1985, 149).
This epistemological argument suggests that imaginary hypotheticals do 
not deliver any moral understanding that is not already available from real 
world experience and empirical knowledge. In this respect, Dancy’s epis-
temological critique of imaginary examples in ethics mirrors Norton’s cri-
tique of the use of thought experiments in the natural sciences, a practice 
which he compares to “[…] an oracle that claims mysterious powers but 
never delivers predictions that could not be learned by simple inferences 
from ordinary experience” (1985, 142).
There is also a further legitimate worry about the way in which dilem-
matic imaginary examples are often structured in terms of stipulations 
that (i) assume perfect knowledge and (ii) artificially restrict the range of 
options available to moral intuition. The general problem with such ideal-
ized and restrictive stipulations stems from the way in which they model 
the moral rationalist’s assumption that, in principle, there is a right answer 
to every situation of choice. This assumption tends to reinforce misplaced 
confidence in intuitions and undermine reflective moral humility. The 
standard professional response of the trained analytic philosopher is to 
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accept such idealized stipulations. Alternatively, however, as Cora Dia-
mond recognizes, it may be as reasonable, and perhaps more reasonable, 
to assume that “[…] a morally troubling situation is usually one which 
needs exploration” such that “no ‘canned’ description in terms of the 
protagonist’s having just this or that pair of alternatives with such-and-
such probable outcomes is realistic in relation to what moral life is really 
like” (2002, 243).
To my mind, these sceptical arguments are powerful enough to chasten 
the analytic method of employing imaginary examples, but not powerful 
enough to thoroughly discredit it. They show that the method can at best 
serve as a supplement to, but never as a substitute for the lessons of 
moral experience and empirical understanding. Accordingly, my thesis is 
not that imaginary hypotheticals are worthless and should be eschewed 
at all costs in just war theory; rather, it is that such examples should not 
predominate in theorizing the ethics of war. Making such examples the 
bread and butter of ethical engagement with war, as too often happens 
in the analytic philosophical literature, leads to the impoverishment of 
theoretical sensitivity to prevailing patterns of empirical reality. Hence, in 
my criticisms of certain imaginary examples in just war theory below, I 
shall be concerned to curtail their use only in order to avoid (i) stipulating 
incomprehensible or unreasonable conditions of choice, (ii) arguing from 
controversial or uncertain intuitions, (iii) building the core of a theory of 
just warfare from intuitions of questionable or marginal relevance, and 
(iv) distracting attention away from the real problems that dominate the 
world of war as we empirically know it. 
III. mcmAhAn’s probLemAtIc exAmpLes
Notwithstanding the rigour and importance of Jeff McMahan’s revision-
ist just war theory, his case of the ‘Implacable Pursuer’ presents a useful 
focal point for our present purposes because it is emblematic of failures 
(i) through (iv).
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A person is drugged and kidnapped while sleeping by a villain who 
then implants a device in her brain that irresistibly directs her will to 
the task of killing you. As a result, she will implacably pursue your 
death until she kills you, at which time the device will automatically 
deactivate itself.
Let us stipulate that the original person will continue to exist 
throughout the period in which her will is controlled by the device. 
Indeed it seems coherent to suppose that, while she pursues you, a part 
of her conscious mind could observe her own behavior with horror 
but be powerless to exert control over the movements of her body. 
I claim that the Pursuer, who is what I call a Non-Responsible 
Threat, has done nothing to lose any rights or to make herself morally 
liable to attack. Although she is causally implicated in the threat to you, 
that is a wholly external fact about her position in the local causal 
 architecture. It has no more moral significance than the fact that an 
innocent bystander might, through no fault of her own, occupy a posi-
tion in the causal architecture that makes your killing her the only 
means by which you could save your own life. If you would not be 
permitted to kill the innocent bystander as a means of self-preservation, 
you are also not permitted to kill the Non-Responsible Threat in self-
defense. For a Non-Responsible Threat is morally indistinguishable 
from an innocent bystander (2004, 719-720).2
The first problem with this case is that, to my mind, (i) it does not make 
sense. Taken as a whole, either the Implacable Pursuer is a threat, or she 
is morally indistinguishable from a bystander, but not both. Perhaps we 
are supposed to take her in parts, with her mind and body considered as 
separate entities, such that her body presents an objective material threat, 
while her recoiling mind functions subjectively like an oddly phenomeno-
logically involved kind of innocent bystander. Yet, separation between the 
mind and body of the Implacable Pursuer cannot be complete if her will 
has been captured by the stipulated technological device; and if her will 
has been completely captured, it is not clear how much of her ‘conscious 
mind’ can remain opposed to her wilful conduct. In the closest familiar 
examples, such as addictive behaviour, the will may vacillate before set-
tling on a course of action; and consciousness, though it may be similarly 
divided, is never entirely uninvolved in intentional agency. One may wish 
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to know how much of her conscious mind recoils before deciding whether 
or not she is liable to defensive action. If she is of ‘half a mind’ to stop, 
despite continuing her pursuit, is this phenomenological fact, plus the 
background story about how her will was coercively and technologically 
captured, enough to make her a Non-Responsible Threat?
In the above passage, McMahan’s answer to this question is affirma-
tive; but in his more recent work, his answer to the most relevantly sim-
ilar case is negative. His updated example of a Non-Responsible Threat 
is the case of the Cell Phone Operator, which stipulates the following: 
“A man’s cell phone has, without his knowledge, been reprogrammed so 
that when he next presses the ‘send’ button, the phone will send a signal 
that will detonate a bomb that will then kill an innocent person” (2009, 
165). Unlike the Implacable Pursuer, the Cell Phone Operator has no 
conscious knowledge of the objective material threat that his intended 
bodily movements present, such that no part of his mind recoils. In McMa-
han’s revised analysis, the closest analogue to the Implacable Pursuer 
appears to be his case of the Conscientious Driver: 
[…] a person who always keeps her car well maintained and always 
drives carefully and alertly decides to drive to the cinema. On the way, 
a freak event that she could not have anticipated occurs that causes 
her to veer out of control in the direction of a pedestrian.
I will assume that on an objective account of permissibility, this 
conscientious driver is acting impermissibly. It is impermissible to 
drive, or to continue to drive, when one will lose control of the car 
and threaten the life of an innocent person. But of course she cannot 
know that these are the conditions in which she is driving. So while 
on an objective account of permissibility, she is an Excused Threat, on 
a subjective account, she is an Innocent Threat (2009, 165). 
If she has bad luck and will now accidentally kill an innocent person 
unless defensive action is taken against her, she seems liable to neces-
sary and proportionate defensive action (2009, 176).
I can only imagine that the mind of the Conscientious Driver recoils at 
the threat that her hurtling automobile presents to an innocent pedestrian 
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in much the same way as the mind of the Implacable Pursuer recoils at 
the similar threat that her bodily conduct presents. Yet, if the analogy 
holds, we are now invited to see this kind of case as including liability to 
defensive killing. (It is not clear how shooting her, say, with a crack shot 
to the head will stop the threat, since she is no longer in control of the 
vehicle. So we have to imagine that one is in a position to stop the 
vehicle, and kill her in the process, by means of something more power-
ful, like a rocket propelled grenade, which ordinary pedestrians rarely 
possess.) In order to see McMahan’s diverging judgments in the cases of 
the Implacable Pursuer and the Conscientious Driver as consistent, it 
must be supposed that the metaphysical distance between consciousness 
and conduct in the first case is more responsibility-defeating than is the 
non-blameworthy epistemic deficit (the inability to predict an unpredict-
able even) in the second case. It is not clear, however, why this should 
be so. Nor, more importantly, does it seem necessary to resolve such an 
issue in order to reflect upon the ethics of war. The epistemic advantage 
of analytic just war theory is supposed to consist in the light that clear 
intuitions about imaginary cases casts upon the complexity and confusion 
of empirical reality. Yet, here we find ourselves instead (ii) reasoning from 
an uncertain tangle of hypotheticals.
Returning to McMahan’s case of the Implacable Pursuer, we can now 
see how it also (iv) distracts attention from the most salient analogous 
real world phenomena. We do not need to construct such an outlandish 
case in order to elicit intuitions about whether it is justifiable to kill 
someone who poses a lethal threat without being morally responsible for 
it, because we arguably already have ample real world examples of 
Non-Responsible Threats embodied in the form of child warriors who 
have been coerced into military service (Singer 2005). Nor do we need to 
rely entirely on our own ivory tower intuitions, untutored by experience 
of war or military discipline, when we can also draw upon the testimony 
of soldiers who know what it is like to encounter child soldiers on the 
battlefield. Consider the following account from a US Special Forces 
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officer and Vietnam veteran: “And I froze, ‘cos it was a boy, I would say 
between the ages of twelve and fourteen. When he turned at me and 
looked, all of a sudden he turned his whole body and pointed his auto-
matic weapon at me, I just opened up, fired the whole twenty rounds 
right at the kid, and he just laid there. I dropped my weapon and cried” 
(Grossman 2015, 87). This example typifies the general pattern of 
response among soldiers. When faced with Non-Responsible Threats, in 
the form of child soldiers, they shoot to kill. Yet they subsequently suffer 
a lifetime of remorse after the fact. Why? What accounts for the diver-
gence between such real world responses to this kind of situation and 
McMahan’s more clear-cut intuition about the Implacable Pursuer? And 
what lesson should just war theorists draw from these diverging responses?
One difference between McMahan’s response to the Implacable Pur-
suer and the normal soldier’s response to the child combatant may reside 
in the fact that the former, like so much of recent analytic just war theory, 
is about the question of justifiable killing in self-defence.3 In contrast (iii), 
soldiers are systematically and intensively trained not only, nor even 
chiefly, to protect themselves, but also, and chiefly, to protect the other 
members of their combat units, as well as their nation as a whole. Hence, 
the analytic moral philosopher’s idea of individualized and reflectively 
deliberate acts of killing in self-defence contrasts sharply with the reality 
of killing in war as it exists in reality as a product of military training. For 
an empirically informed understanding of soldiering, it is worth attending 
to the findings of military psychologists. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman char-
acterizes warfare as ‘Lord of the Flies with guns’ because the transition from 
normal civilian teenager to trained soldier involves producing a new 
“personality structure” that makes “reflexive killing” possible (2009, 267). 
In untrained individuals there is a deep reluctance to kill other human 
beings, as evidenced in US Army Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall’s find-
ing that only 15% to 20% of US soldiers in World War II who were in the 
line of fire when encountering the enemy actually discharged their weap-
ons (Grossman 2009, 3). Subsequently, through systematic development 
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of intensive military ‘programming’ or ‘conditioning’ procedures employed 
during basic training, the US military managed to increase that firing rate 
to 55% by the time of the Korean War, and 90% to 95% by the time of 
the Vietnam War (Grossman 2009, 36). Much of this ‘success’, if we may 
call it that, is a result of the fact that soldiers are trained in disciplinary 
institutions designed to cultivate martial virtue, which involves learning 
to discount considerations of self-preservation, and embracing the value 
of self-sacrifice for one’s combat unit and one’s nation. Whether this 
military altruism should ultimately be deemed pathological or virtuous is 
an important question, albeit too demanding for present purposes. 
Regardless, the chief point here is to draw attention to the striking fact 
that warfare is often a scene of distinctly altruistic violence. This fact is 
(iii) too often left out in the construction of imaginary hypotheticals in 
the analytic philosophical literature. 
So if the question is whether one does, as a trained combatant, kill 
the child warrior who arguably poses a Non-Responsible Threat, the insti-
tutional military answer is affirmative, with the caveat that one is also 
entitled (and inclined) to feel wretched about it after the fact. Viewed in 
this light, from the standpoint of the trained soldier, empirical examples 
of killing child soldiers are more troubling than the imaginary notion of 
killing a technologically programed Implacable Pursuer in self-defence. 
In the case of the child soldier, the tragic elements are dynamically linked 
in our moral psychology in a way that may be lost on us when we pull 
them apart analytically. This is just one example of the distance between 
an academic philosopher and a combatant conditioned for battle: one is 
trained to render highly reflective judgments about when it is acceptable 
to kill, while the other is trained to kill reflexively without the luxury of 
thorough deliberation. One therefore has to wonder about the purpose 
of writing books on how to kill reflectively, and upon due deliberation, 
for a society that trains its soldiers to kill automatically, without a 
moment’s hesitation. It could be in order to call such military conditioning 
into question, though I have never seen this practical implication explicitly 
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articulated in the analytic just war literature. When we consider child 
combatants as a class of real world phenomena, we know from empirical 
studies of military conditioning that if we train soldiers to kill reflexively 
in the face of all kinds of lethal threats to themselves, and more impor-
tantly to their immediate comrades and more remote compatriots, then 
the outcome in most cases will be that children will die and soldiers will 
be emotionally maimed. The question then becomes whether we should 
train our troops in this way, designing an army that predictably kills child 
combatants, or whether we should train the army for reflective restraint 
in such cases, and consequently lose the lives of a greater number of 
soldiers to a predictable increase in the frequency of child soldier attacks. 
This is a much harder question than the case of the Implacable Pursuer, 
because it is difficult to answer by way of a simple deontological moral 
intuition about a singular decontextualized act.
It is worth noting here that when McMahan provides an analysis of 
child soldiers in Killing in War (2009), after leaving behind the case of the 
Implacable Pursuer that was central to his analysis of Non-Responsible 
Threats for more than a decade, he argues that “[…] we should resist the 
suggestion that it is a reasonable presumption that child soldiers are Non-
responsible Threats” (2009, 200). This claim may seem surprising, given 
the relevant similarities between the Implacable Pursuer and the child 
soldier. But his updated example of a Non-Responsible Threat, the Cell 
Phone Operator, is not so relevantly similar. In the latter case, the agent 
in question is completely oblivious to the threat that his actions present. 
Hence, McMahan’s reasons for excluding child soldiers from this revised 
class of Non-Responsible threats is that, despite sometimes being as 
young as eight years old (if not younger), child soldiers “[…] have also 
been forced to adapt to their circumstances and usually, as a consequence, 
have become precociously mature in various ways,” and that “[…] no one 
really supposes that a child of 10, even one who has been subjected to 
terrible abuse, is wholly lacking in moral responsibility for his action” 
(2009, 200). Instead of seeing them as Non-Responsible threats, as the 
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Case of the Implacable Pursuer arguably suggests, he now includes them 
in a broader class of “Partially Excused Threats” that includes most “adult 
unjust combatants” (2009, 201). According to this updated analysis, child 
soldiers are not different in kind from most adult unjust combatants, 
though their excuses may be stronger by degrees. Accordingly, “[…] 
when just combatants could use lesser force against child soldiers without 
seriously compromising their ability to achieve their just aims, they may 
be morally required to fight with restraint, even at greater risk to them-
selves” (2009, 201). The rationale for exercising somewhat greater military 
restraint in response to the threats that child soldiers present has to do 
not only with “the child soldier’s excuses,” but also with the important 
fact that “[…] these soldiers are children – that is, individuals who have 
hardly had a chance at life and have already been terribly victimized” 
(2009, 201)4. There is good reason, however, for harbouring serious res-
ervations with this analysis, not least because child soldiers, far from 
being morally precocious, are typically morally stunted by the traumas 
that they endure.
Returning to McMahan’s case of the Implacable Pursuer, it is worth 
examining the range of intuitive options. One might endorse or reject his 
initial intuition that it is unjust to kill her in defence of one’s own life, or 
one might elect to suspend judgment. In my experience in the classroom, 
students are often divided between these three forms of response. Some 
hold, contrary to McMahan’s stated intuition, that killing the Implacable 
Pursuer is permissible. Others do not know either way. In his response 
to the example, Walzer states, “I don’t have any clear intuition about the 
case of the Implacable Pursuer (except for the intuition that it isn’t a likely 
case in the world that I know)” (2006, 43). So the first problem this 
example raises is that, (ii) when there is room for reasonable philosophi-
cal disagreement about how best to respond, or deep uncertainty about 
how best to respond, the intuition-driven methodology of analytic just 
war theory is at an impasse. There is no higher court of appeal, nor any 
command hierarchy among philosophers. Nor is there any institutional 
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imperative of unit cohesion. Consequently, philosophers are free to cling 
to diverging intuitions, and to agree to disagree. This academic privilege 
of proffering independent intuitions is worlds apart from the exigencies 
of military decision-making within combat zones. The latter decisions are 
subject to command hierarchies and intensive training. This stark contrast 
raises an important question about how and how much just war theorists 
should accommodate their thinking to the realities of military service. 
It would, of course, be appalling to suggest that philosophers should be 
similarly subjected to a centralized command and control bureaucracy in 
order to resolve methodological stalemates arising from the free interplay 
of moral intuitions. And it would be a mistake to suppose that philoso-
phers must entirely sacrifice critical distance from the patterns of judg-
ment to which soldiers are habituated through military discipline. Yet, 
some accommodation must be made to empirical reality in order for just 
war theorists to engage directly with systematic institutional responses to 
dilemmas of this sort. Otherwise, we run the risk of (iii) using such exam-
ples to elicit intuitions of questionable practical relevance. Since it is 
impracticable to train soldiers to render subtle metaphysical analyses of 
the threats that they face in the heat of battle, as the isolated and decon-
textualized case of the Implacable Pursuer demands, it seems more rea-
sonable instead for just war theorists to engage with the practice of killing 
in war on an empirical and institutional level.
The philosopher’s sense of what he or she would do in response to 
the Implacable Pursuer will invariably reflect his or her habits of mind 
and the background experiences that have shaped those habits. For this 
reason, it is natural that many of us may struggle to find firm intuitive 
footing when faced with such a case. As Michael Davis notes, “If we have 
little or no experience of anything similar, our response to the imaginary 
case – what we judge, believe, think, or feel we would do – is unlikely to 
be a reliable guide to what we actually would do” (2012, 11).5 For this 
reason, heavy reliance on imaginary cases is not likely to help us to map 
our ethical commitments. The ethical commitments we know best are the 
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ones we have experience putting into practice. Consequently, as Davis 
notes, “[…] the less familiar the imaginary case, the less reliable our 
[intuited] response” (2012, 11). For this reason, it is not enough for phi-
losophers to rely on their intuitions alone. They must exercise their moral 
imaginations not only to think up hypothetical counterexamples, but also 
to empathize with soldiers and victims of war who inhabit very different 
contexts of human action.
Sam Black and Jon Tweedale make a related yet contrasting point in 
discussing the use of imaginary hypotheticals in theories of moral respon-
sibility. They argue that, “The subjects of these examples must also be 
relevantly similar to ordinary human beings” (2002, 281). Yet their worry 
is not that our intuitions about such cases will be too weak in the sense 
of being unconfident. Instead, their worry is that, “[…] if the examples 
are too farfetched, they risk deceiving us into thinking we hold firm views 
on topics when, in fact, we have no idea what we believe” (2002, 295-
296). Typically, as in McMahan’s case of the Implacable Pursuer, the 
analytic philosophical method employs imaginary hypotheticals that stip-
ulate epistemic conditions of perfect knowledge. In this respect, the 
method belongs to an ideal moral rationalism, which assumes that there 
must be a right or wrong answer to every moral dilemma from the stand-
point of an omniscient judge. Insofar as philosophers assume this stand-
point, from which they are asked to choose one side or the other of 
thorny dilemmas, they are methodologically encouraged to render deci-
sive judgments on the basis of what may often be only weak intuitions 
or slight moral preferences. If one assumes that the standard of rational 
certainty about right or wrong is always achievable in principle, then one 
will expect oneself to render precisely this kind of judgment.  Conse-
quently, this method too often leads analytic philosophers to commit 
what we might call the fallacy of overconfident intuitions.
In contrast, examination of historical cases is often a stark reminder 
of the messiness, complexity, uncertainty, and moral ambiguity of human 
affairs. As such, a historicist approach to just war theory naturally calls for 
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humility, moderation, nuance, and sometimes explicit uneasiness in ethical 
judgment. Moreover, when we disagree about how to judge historical 
cases, we are rarely at a methodological impasse. Instead of agreeing to 
disagree, we can argue about the case on the basis of historical evidence. 
If I disagree with Walzer’s justification of Israel’s preventive military oper-
ations in the Six-Day War, I can cite evidence of the lack of a credible 
threat. Consider the fact – later publicly acknowledged by such Israeli 
leaders as Mattiyahu Peled, Ariel Sharon, and Menachem Begin – that 
Israel’s forces outnumbered those of the Arab states 2.4 to 1, and that 
Gamer Abdel Nasser evidently had no intention of initiating an assault 
(Quigley 2013). Walzer and other supporters of the Six-Day War could 
respond in part by recounting the legitimate fears of the Israeli people, 
informed by memories of the Holocaust, as they huddled together in shel-
ters night after night in the late spring and early summer of 1967. In 
response I may concede that Israel’s objectively unjustifiable offensive was 
subjectively excusable among the populace, if not among their leaders. 
One of the methodological advantages of this kind of historicist engage-
ment is the way in which it moderates ethical judgment through dialectical 
engagement. And another is the way in which it brings home in the prac-
tice of argument the moral realism that (as Walzer has argued) is an essen-
tial element of the meta-ethics of just war theory. It shows that we cannot 
readily pull apart the facts of the case from our ethical evaluation of it.
IV. A truLy dAngerous exAmpLe
The worst imaginary example in philosophical analyses of political 
 violence is by far the most successful: the Ticking Time Bomb scenario. 
This case applies to the treatment of prisoners of war in the context of 
international armed conflicts, as well as the treatment of detainees in non-
international conflicts (civil wars), and in both domestic and international 
counterterrorism warfare. According to the customary stipulation, the only 
way to save a great number of potential innocent victims of a terrorist 
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bombing is to torture a known terrorist who will assuredly tell you how 
to defuse the threat. Here the deontic modality in question is the moral 
permissibility or impermissibility of torture, understood as the deliberate 
infliction of severe physical and/or mental pain and suffering on a 
restrained and helpless captive. The scenario suggests to (ii) a slight 
majority of minds6 that torture is not necessarily wrong, and may some-
times be practically necessary. Consequently, those who would intuitively 
embrace torture in this case conclude that there is no absolute prohibition 
against the practice of inflicting acute pain and suffering on vulnerable 
captives for the purpose of gathering intelligence to enhance security.
There are serious issues, however, concerning how much importance, 
if any, to place on this overworked imaginary example. Like many imag-
inary examples structured by dilemmatic stipulations, we must ask our-
selves (i) how reasonable it is to accept its terms. The ticking bomb 
scenario stipulates that we must choose between allowing a time bomb 
to kill some large number of people or torturing someone whom we 
know will provide information that will enable us to defuse the bomb in 
time to save those people. We are told to imagine that there are no other 
options. There are abundant reasons, however, for rejecting the stipulated 
terms of the ticking time bomb scenario. It is not a situation that is likely 
ever to occur. Indeed there have been no publicly demonstrated cases of 
the sort. Yet, by virtue of occupying centre stage during ethical discus-
sions, the case has long been an academic institution unto itself. Since the 
analytic method that employs it aims to reason by analogy from the 
imaginary case to ‘relevantly similar’ cases in real life, it tends by design to 
facilitate ramification. Once torture is permitted in one extreme case, it 
will seem incrementally more reasonable to extend the same permission 
to cases that differ only by degrees, such as numbers of victims and prob-
abilities of success. Thus, (iii) there is a limited but very real slippery slope 
problem that leads from the imaginary hypothetical example of the ticking 
bomb to a living security paradigm that shapes institutionalized practice 
and political culture.
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To see how an ivory tower notion can infect the political culture of 
a militarized society, it is enough to consider how this kind of purely 
imaginary scenario was presented as the daily reality of Jack Bauer, the 
fictional hero in the popular television series ‘24’. The show was exceed-
ingly popular with cadets at West Point, as well as soldiers on duty during 
the occupation of Iraq. Soldiers emulating Jack Bauer were inspired to 
see their daily operational situations in similar terms, imagining that every 
detainee is a potential terrorist who might reveal deadly plot lines if sub-
jected to so-called ‘enhanced interrogation’. By 2006, top military brass, 
including US Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, then Dean of 
West Point, became convinced that the show was effectively undermining 
US military training in the laws of war by turning an academic hypothetical 
scenario into the central imaginary paradigm (the ‘meat and potatoes’) of 
American security operations. Thus, a seemingly idle philosophical fiction 
gave rise to a cruel and inhumane operational fiction.
As top military interrogators overwhelmingly attest, inflicting pain 
and suffering on detainees is not an effective intelligence gathering method 
in comparison with many other, more humane tricks of the trade (Mayer 
2007). Hence the US Army’s Field Manual 34-52 on Intelligence Interrogation 
(1992) avers that torture is a “[…] poor technique that yields unreliable 
results,” that “may damage subsequent collection efforts”, and that “will 
bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces while undermining domes-
tic and international support for the war effort” (Department of the Army 
1992, 1-8). After a systematic review of the George W. Bush administra-
tion’s post-9/11 experiment with so-called ‘enhanced interrogation’, 
FM 34-52 was replaced by Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector 
 Operations 2-22.3 (Department of the Army 2006), which reaffirmed every 
word of the earlier finding. In short, (i) the immediate problem with the 
stipulated dilemma of this imaginary example is that in reality there are 
always better options available.7
Moreover, this shortcoming of the ticking time bomb scenario has 
broader adverse intellectual ramifications. The inordinate attention that 
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the example receives is (iv) a distraction from the real considerations of 
consequence that undergird the convention of benevolent quarantine. 
It is common knowledge that the practice of torturing prisoners of war, 
including detainees of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations, 
undermines incentives to surrender, and inflames resentments in affiliated 
populations, both of which tend to harden resistance and forestall peace 
settlements. For this reason, in addition to the inherent moral ghastliness 
of the practice, the international community has banned torture again and 
again. In light of everything that can be said against the actual practice of 
torture, it is morally irresponsible to allow an imaginary example, with no 
basis in reality, to erode the military’s legitimate time-honoured commit-
ment to the legal and ethical obligations of benevolent quarantine. There-
fore, in order to avoid complicity in the erosion of military conscience 
that leads, for example, to the kinds of barbarity witnessed at Abu Ghraib, 
academic theorists should reject the stipulated terms of the ticking time 
bomb example, and refuse to anthologize and teach it except as an object 
lesson in how not to theorize the ethics of war.
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notes
1. Rittner and Roth (2012).
2. A slightly different version of the case also appeared in McMahan (1994). 
3. For accounts that see the personal right of self-defence as central to just war theory, see 
Nagel (1979, 53-74); Lackey (1989, 18); Otsuka (1994, 74-94). For a systematic critique of the idea 
that warfare can be grounded in the right of self-defence, see Rodin (2005). 
4. McMahan does not address the possibility that child soldiers may be ‘just combatants’, 
presumably because just combatants do not deploy children in war.
5. See also Jamieson (2001, 476-486).
6. As Davis (2012, 12) notes, surveys that Fritz Allhoff conducted to assess student approval 
rates of torture in ticking time bomb scenarios are on average much closer to neutral (‘not sure’) 
than approval (‘strong agreement’). 
7. For a thorough dismantling of the ticking time bomb scenario, see Luban (2008).
